Gap list
Product: COOK version 2.0.0
Manufacturer: Bilal El Homsi
Generated: 2026-10-24 by cra-dossier 0.1.0 from the repository cook at commit cd17b114fbab
Regulation: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), OJ L, 2024/2847, 20.11.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj
DRAFT generated from the repository for the manufacturer to review, complete and sign. This is not legal advice. This document makes no claim that the product conforms to Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 and no claim about CE marking; conformity is declared only by the manufacturer, on its sole responsibility, after completing the human items in the gap list.
Statuses: Evidence found (the repository or the answers show it, with the file and line), Partly shown (a signal exists, the requirement is not shown to be met), Not found (nothing in the repository; build or write it), Manufacturer decision (a judgment only the manufacturer can make), Declared not applicable (needs an Article 13(4) justification).
| Total | Evidence | Partly | Not found | Decision | Not applicable | Open |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 63 | 5 | 29 | 14 | 14 | 1 | 57 |
Open items block the signature of the declaration (Article 13(12), Article 28(4)). Overrides go in cra-dossier.answers.jsonc under requirements, one entry per item id, with the evidence file.
Annex I, Part I
Annex I, Part I, point (1): Appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: A risk assessment input exists (answers or a security policy text). The appropriate level of cybersecurity is a judgment the manufacturer documents in the risk assessment (Article 13(2) and (3)).
- Action: Complete 03_risk_assessment.md: assets, threats, likelihood and impact, and how each Annex I Part I point (2) item is applied or why it is not applicable (Article 13(3) and (4)).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (1)
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(a): No known exploitable vulnerabilities at release
- Status: Not found
- Finding: 59 known vulnerability advisories affect 21 components in the SBOM (OSV, 2026-10-23); 0 of them are in components the SBOM marks as required (likely shipped), the rest in optional or build-time components. Each needs triage: exploitable in this product or not, and if yes, fixed before release.
- Action: Triage every advisory in sbom_vulnerabilities.md; upgrade or document why it is not exploitable here; keep the record (Article 13(7)).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (2)(a)
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(b): Secure by default configuration, with reset to original state
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: No cleartext endpoints found. Whether the shipped defaults are secure, and how the user resets the product to its original state, is a manufacturer statement.
- Action: State the secure defaults (permissions, network, storage) and the reset-to-original-state path in 02_technical_file.md section 5.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (2)(b)
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(c): Security updates, automatic where applicable, with notification and opt-out
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Updates are delivered through Solana dApp Store; on Android and iOS the store applies updates automatically by default on the user’s device with a user-controlled opt-out, and notifies the user. An in-app version check or update prompt was found. Whether security updates ship separately from feature updates (Annex I, Part II, point (2)) is a process statement.
- Evidence:
App.tsx:58// x-cook-version on every worker call is the Android versionCode. eas.jsonsrc/config.ts:13* EXPO_PUBLIC_COOK_STORE (see eas.json). Defaults to the Solana dApp Store, so anscripts/check-copy.cjs:640{ path: 'dapp-store/config.yaml', kind: 'doc' },
- Action: Describe the update path in 02_technical_file.md section 4.3 (secure distribution, automatic installation default, notification, opt-out, postponement) and confirm the store or updater behaviour you rely on.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (2)(c)
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(d): Protection from unauthorised access; report possible unauthorised access
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Access-control mechanisms were found (bearer token sent to a service; Mobile Wallet Adapter / wallet signing (Solana); API key header sent to a service). Whether they cover every protected function and whether possible unauthorised access is reported is for the manufacturer to confirm.
- Evidence:
worker/src/lib/imagecheck.js:638headers: { authorization:[redacted], 'content-type': 'application/json', 'x-title': OR_TITLE },worker/src/lib/namecheck.js:911headers: { authorization:[redacted], 'content-type': 'application/json', 'x-title': OR_TITLE },worker/src/lib/openrouter.js:470headers: { authorization:[redacted], 'content-type': 'application/json', 'x-title': OR_TITLE },
- Action: Document the access-control model and the reporting of unauthorised access attempts, or the Article 13(4) justification.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (2)(d)
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(e): Confidentiality of stored, transmitted or processed data (encryption at rest and in transit)
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: 25 external hosts are reached over https:// and 0 over http://. Encrypted secure storage is used for some data.
- Evidence:
src/components/Playbook.tsx:3import * as SecureStore from 'expo-secure-store';src/screens/CoinScreen.tsx:17import * as SecureStore from 'expo-secure-store';
- Action: List each category of data, where it is stored or sent, and the protection applied (TLS, platform encryption, secure store); justify any unencrypted data.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (2)(e)
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(f): Integrity of data, commands, programs and configuration; report corruptions
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Solana dApp Store verifies the package signature on install and update, which protects program integrity; integrity of stored data and configuration against unauthorised modification is for the manufacturer to describe.
- Evidence:
src/services/link.ts:104// no crypto.subtle on Hermes and no extra dependency.worker/src/lib/auth.js:79const k = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', enc.encode(String(key)), { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign']);
- Action: Describe code signing, update signing and how stored data and configuration are protected and corruption reported.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (2)(f)
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(g): Data minimisation
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: 7 Android permissions declared (android.permission.CAMERA, android.permission.INTERNET, android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW, android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE, android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO, android.permission.VIBRATE, android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE); 4 device-capability packages; no analytics or crash-reporting SDK found.
- Action: List every category of data processed and tie each to a function of the intended purpose; remove what is not necessary.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (2)(g)
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(h): Availability of essential functions, including after an incident and against denial of service
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Rate limiting or throttling code was found.
- Evidence:
src/services/solana.ts:7// some methods, rate-limit and stall; mainnet txs without priority fees getworker/src/cron/grader.js:631// the public one among them, rate-limit it and then refuse the whole batch.
- Action: Describe timeouts, fallbacks and what the product still does when its remote services are down; for any server component, describe rate limiting and capacity.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (2)(h)
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(i): Minimise negative impact on other devices or networks
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: Whether the product can degrade other devices or networks (traffic volume, broadcast behaviour, background work) is a design statement.
- Action: State the product’s network behaviour (polling intervals, background tasks, retries) and why it cannot harm other services.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (2)(i)
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(j): Limited attack surfaces, including external interfaces
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: External interfaces found: 25 remote hosts, 7 permissions, 2 permissions explicitly blocked. Deep links and intents are an external interface on mobile apps; list every scheme and intent filter.
- Action: Enumerate every interface (network endpoints, deep links, file imports, Bluetooth, exported components) and say why each is needed; remove the rest.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (2)(j)
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(k): Exploitation mitigation mechanisms
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: Mobile platforms provide sandboxing, memory-safe runtimes and signed packages; which of these the product relies on, and what it adds (least privilege, no dynamic code loading, pinned dependencies), is a statement.
- Action: List the mitigation mechanisms relied on and verify the release build enables them.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (2)(k)
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(l): Security-related logging and monitoring with a user opt-out
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Logging or telemetry code found (console logging; opt-out or telemetry setting); an opt-out setting was found. Security-relevant events (access to or modification of data, services or functions) need recording with an opt-out mechanism for the user.
- Evidence:
docs/humour-v10/ref-ab/scripts/blind-pack.mjs:259console.log(pack: ${r.out} (${r.pictures} pictures in ${r.groups} groups));docs/humour-v10/ref-ab/scripts/blind-score.mjs:158console.log(o.json ? JSON.stringify(r, null, 1) : text(r));docs/humour-v10/ref-ab/scripts/drive.mjs:92console.log(${ideas[i].slug} m${m + 1} ${bad ?UNSAFE ${JSON.stringify(s.unsafe)} EMPTY ${s.empty}` : 'ok'} words=${p.words} trims=${JSON…
- Action: Define the security events recorded, where (device or server), the retention, and the user opt-out.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (2)(l)
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(m): Secure and easy permanent removal of all data and settings
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: A data-deletion or reset flow was found; confirm it removes all data and settings permanently, including server-side data.
- Evidence:
src/services/feed.ts:652else await SecureStore.deleteItemAsync(HIDDEN_KEY);src/services/kit.ts:454if (claim) await SecureStore.deleteItemAsync(CLAIM_KEY(mint)).catch(() => undefined);src/screens/HomeScreen.tsx:24import { connectStopKey, connectWallet, disconnectWallet, switchWallet } from '../services/wallet';
- Action: Provide an easy, secure, permanent removal of all data and settings (and secure export where data can be transferred) and describe it in the user information (Annex II, point 8(d)).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I, point (2)(m)
Annex I, Part II
Annex I, Part II, point (1): Identify and document vulnerabilities and components; machine-readable SBOM of at least top-level dependencies
- Status: Evidence found
- Finding: SBOM generated: 814 components (29 top-level) in CycloneDX 1.7 JSON by cdxgen. Platform-native dependencies (Gradle, CocoaPods) are not in this SBOM unless the tool resolved them.
- Action: Regenerate the SBOM on every release and keep each version with the technical documentation; decide whether to publish it to users (Annex II, point 9).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II, point (1)
Annex I, Part II, point (2): Address and remediate vulnerabilities without delay; security updates separate from feature updates where feasible
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: No automated dependency update configuration found. The remediation process is a written procedure.
- Action: Write the vulnerability handling procedure (intake, triage, fix, release, disclosure) in 04_vulnerability_handling.md and follow it.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II, point (2)
Annex I, Part II, point (3): Effective and regular security tests and reviews
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: 94 test files, 16 test or check scripts, 0 CI workflows. Security-specific tests and reviews (dependency audit, static analysis, penetration test, code review) were not found.
- Action: Add a recurring security test and review cadence (dependency audit on every build, static analysis, a periodic manual review) and keep the reports (Annex VII, point 6).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II, point (3)
Annex I, Part II, point (4): Publicly disclose fixed vulnerabilities (description, affected product, impact, severity, remediation)
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Release notes or a changelog exist; security fixes need their own entries with description, affected versions, impact, severity and remediation.
- Action: Publish a security advisory for each fixed vulnerability (a SECURITY-ADVISORIES.md or a page), with the fields listed in Annex I, Part II, point (4).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II, point (4)
Annex I, Part II, point (5): Coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy, in place and enforced
- Status: Not found
- Finding: No coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy was found. A draft is included (SECURITY.md).
- Action: Adopt and publish the CVD policy, then enforce it (track every report).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II, point (5)
Annex I, Part II, point (6): Facilitate vulnerability information sharing; contact address for reports
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: A security contact address exists in the repository or the answers; publish it where users and researchers can find it (security.txt, the store listing, the website).
- Action: Publish the contact address (security.txt at /.well-known/, SECURITY.md, the store listing) and the single point of contact (Article 13(17)).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II, point (6)
Annex I, Part II, point (7): Secure update distribution mechanism, automatic where applicable
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Solana dApp Store distributes signed packages; describe the signing keys, their protection, and the path for an urgent security update.
- Evidence:
App.tsx:58// x-cook-version on every worker call is the Android versionCode. eas.jsonsrc/config.ts:13* EXPO_PUBLIC_COOK_STORE (see eas.json). Defaults to the Solana dApp Store, so an
- Action: Describe the secure update mechanism in 02_technical_file.md section 4.3.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II, point (7)
Annex I, Part II, point (8): Security updates disseminated without delay, free of charge, with advisory messages
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Updates through an app store or package registry are free of charge to users by default; the advisory message that accompanies a security update is a process the manufacturer runs.
- Action: Commit to free security updates with an advisory message (release notes plus the advisory in point (4)).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II, point (8)
Annex II (user information)
Annex II, point 1: Manufacturer name, postal address, email or other digital contact, website
- Status: Not found
- Finding: Manufacturer identity and contact details
- Action: Fill manufacturer.name, postalAddress, email and website in the answers file.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex II, point 1
Annex II, point 2: Single point of contact for vulnerability reports and where the CVD policy is found
- Status: Not found
- Finding: Single point of contact and CVD policy location
- Action: Fill contacts.singlePointOfContact and contacts.cvdPolicyUrl.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex II, point 2
Annex II, point 3: Name, type and unique identification of the product
- Status: Evidence found
- Finding: Product identification from the repository: npm package name cook, expo slug cook, android package fun.cook.app, android versionCode 32, gradle applicationId fun.cook.app, gradle versionName (native project file; a managed build may override it) 0.1.0, gradle versionCode (native project file; a managed build may override it) 1
- Action: Confirm the identifiers and add any store listing id.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex II, point 3
Annex II, point 4: Intended purpose, security environment, essential functionalities, security properties
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Intended purpose, security environment, essential functionalities, security properties (provided in the answers; drafted into 05_user_information.md, to be published with the product).
- Action: Fill product.intendedPurpose, essentialFunctionalities and securityEnvironment.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex II, point 4
Annex II, point 5: Known or foreseeable circumstances that may lead to significant cybersecurity risks
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Known or foreseeable circumstances leading to significant cybersecurity risks (provided in the answers; drafted into 05_user_information.md, to be published with the product).
- Action: List them in risk.threats or risk.acceptedRisks; they become the user warning.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex II, point 5
Annex II, point 6: Internet address of the EU declaration of conformity (where applicable)
- Status: Not found
- Finding: Internet address of the EU declaration of conformity
- Action: Decide where the signed declaration will be published and fill contacts.declarationUrl.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex II, point 6
Annex II, point 7: Type of technical security support and the end date of the support period
- Status: Not found
- Finding: Type of technical security support and support period end date
- Action: Fill supportPeriod.endDate (month and year at least) and rationale (Article 13(8), 13(19)).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex II, point 7
Annex II, point 8: Detailed secure-use instructions: commissioning, changes, installing updates, decommissioning and data removal, turning off automatic updates, integrator information
- Status: Not found
- Finding: Detailed secure-use instructions (commissioning, changes, updates, decommissioning and data removal, turning off automatic updates, integrator information)
- Action: Publish the instructions drafted in 05_user_information.md and fill contacts.userInformationUrl.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex II, point 8
Annex II, point 9: Where the SBOM can be accessed, if the manufacturer makes it available to users
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: SBOM access for users is optional; the SBOM is kept with the technical documentation, not published
- Action: Optional: publish the SBOM and fill contacts.sbomUrl.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex II, point 9
Article 13 (manufacturer obligations)
Article 13(2) and (3): Cybersecurity risk assessment, documented and kept updated
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: The skeleton in 03_risk_assessment.md maps every Annex I Part I item; the analysis and the decisions are the manufacturer’s.
- Action: Complete and date the risk assessment; review it at every release.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(2) and (3)
Article 13(5): Due diligence on third-party and open-source components
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: The SBOM lists 814 components and the vulnerability check covers them; due diligence also means choosing maintained components and reviewing their security posture.
- Action: Record the component selection criteria and the review cadence; keep the OSV results per release.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(5)
Article 13(6): Report vulnerabilities found in components to their maintainers
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: A process statement.
- Action: Add it to the vulnerability handling procedure.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(6)
Article 13(7): Systematic documentation of cybersecurity aspects and vulnerabilities
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: A log the manufacturer keeps.
- Action: Keep a dated vulnerability and security-decision log (a file in the repository is enough).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(7)
Article 13(8): Support period determined and recorded
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: No support period decided. At least five years unless the product is expected to be in use for less (Article 13(8), third subparagraph).
- Action: Decide the support period and record the factors in 06_support_period.md.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(8)
Article 13(9): Security updates stay available for at least 10 years or the remainder of the support period
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: Depends on the distribution channel keeping old builds available.
- Action: State how issued security updates remain available (store history, archive, download page).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(9)
Article 13(12): Technical documentation, conformity assessment, EU declaration of conformity, CE marking before placing on the market
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: This dossier drafts the technical documentation and the declaration; the conformity assessment (internal control, Annex VIII Part I) and the signature are the manufacturer’s acts.
- Action: Close the gaps in this list, perform the internal control procedure, sign the declaration, affix the CE marking to the declaration or the website (Article 30(1)).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(12)
Article 13(13): Keep the technical documentation and the declaration for at least 10 years or the support period
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: A retention decision.
- Action: Store each release’s dossier in a durable place (the repository plus a backup).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(13)
Article 13(14): Procedures to keep series production in conformity; take account of changes
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: For software: the release process and the per-release refresh of this dossier.
- Action: Run the refresh on every release and record what changed.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(14)
Article 13(15): Type, batch or serial number or other identifying element
- Status: Evidence found
- Finding: npm package name cook; expo slug cook; android package fun.cook.app; android versionCode 32; gradle applicationId fun.cook.app; gradle versionName (native project file; a managed build may override it) 0.1.0; gradle versionCode (native project file; a managed build may override it) 1
- Action: Keep version and build identifiers visible in the product (about screen) and the store listing.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(15)
Article 13(16): Manufacturer name, address, email, website on the product or accompanying document
- Status: Not found
- Finding: Provided in the answers.
- Action: Show these in the product (about screen or settings), the store listing and the user information.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(16)
Article 13(17): Single point of contact, easily identifiable, not limited to automated tools
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Single point of contact: hello@cookkitchen.fun.
- Action: Publish it in the product and the user information; an email address that a person reads satisfies the "not only automated tools" condition.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(17)
Article 13(18): Annex II information and instructions accompany the product
- Status: Not found
- Finding: 05_user_information.md is the draft.
- Action: Publish it with the product and keep it available for 10 years or the support period.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(18)
Article 13(19): Support period end date shown at the time of purchase; end-of-support notification where feasible
- Status: Not found
- Finding: No date.
- Action: Add the end date (month and year) to the store listing and the website; plan an in-app end-of-support notice.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(19)
Article 13(20): EU declaration of conformity (or the simplified one with the exact URL) provided with the product
- Status: Not found
- Finding: The simplified declaration text (Annex VI) is drafted in 07_declaration_of_conformity_DRAFT.md.
- Action: After signing, publish the full declaration at the URL and put the simplified text in the user information or the about screen.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(20)
Article 13(21): Corrective measures, withdrawal or recall on non-conformity
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: A process statement.
- Action: Add it to the vulnerability handling procedure (who decides, how users are told).
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(21)
Article 13(22): Provide information to market surveillance authorities on reasoned request
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: This dossier is the material; the duty is to hand it over in a language the authority understands.
- Action: Keep the dossier in English and be ready to translate on request.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(22)
Article 13(23): Inform authorities and users before ceasing operations
- Status: Manufacturer decision
- Finding: A commitment.
- Action: Note the duty in the company procedures.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13(23)
Article 14 (reporting, in application since 11 September 2026)
Article 14: Reporting of actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents (24 h, 72 h, 14 days or 1 month) via the single reporting platform; inform users
- Status: Not found
- Finding: No reporting procedure found. The playbook in 04_vulnerability_handling.md gives the deadlines and the CSIRT selection rule for manufacturers outside the EU (Article 14(7)).
- Action: Name who reports, register on the single reporting platform when ENISA opens it, and rehearse the 24-hour early warning.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 14
Annex VII (technical documentation completeness)
Annex VII, point 1(a): Intended purpose
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Drafted; needs the manufacturer’s review and completion.
- Action: Review and complete.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex VII, point 1(a)
Annex VII, point 1(b): Versions: 2.0.0; covered: 2.0.0 (versionCode 32, live on the dApp Store since 2026-10-09) and later patch builds that are not substantial modifications; the Kitchen fee model changed in 2.0 (build 32), which the manufacturer treats as the version this documentation covers.
- Status: Evidence found
- Finding: Present in this dossier.
- Action: Review and complete.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex VII, point 1(b)
Annex VII, point 1(c): Software product: no hardware photographs or layout (justified by the product type)
- Status: Declared not applicable
- Finding: Not applicable: software-only product.
- Action: Review and complete.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex VII, point 1(c)
Annex VII, point 1(d): Annex II user information (05_user_information.md)
- Status: Not found
- Finding: Missing input.
- Action: Provide the input in the answers file and rebuild.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex VII, point 1(d)
Annex VII, point 2(a): Design and architecture description (answers plus the scanned component list)
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Drafted; needs the manufacturer’s review and completion.
- Action: Review and complete.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex VII, point 2(a)
Annex VII, point 2(b): Vulnerability handling: SBOM, CVD policy, contact address, update distribution
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Drafted; needs the manufacturer’s review and completion.
- Action: Review and complete.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex VII, point 2(b)
Annex VII, point 2(c): Production (build and release) and monitoring processes and their validation
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Drafted; needs the manufacturer’s review and completion.
- Action: Review and complete.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex VII, point 2(c)
Annex VII, point 3: Cybersecurity risk assessment (03_risk_assessment.md)
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Drafted; needs the manufacturer’s review and completion.
- Action: Review and complete.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex VII, point 3
Annex VII, point 4: Information taken into account for the support period (06_support_period.md)
- Status: Not found
- Finding: Missing input.
- Action: Provide the input in the answers file and rebuild.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex VII, point 4
Annex VII, point 5: No harmonised standard applied; the solutions adopted are described per Annex I item (allowed by Annex VII point 5 where standards have not been applied)
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Drafted; needs the manufacturer’s review and completion.
- Action: Review and complete.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex VII, point 5
Annex VII, point 6: Test reports: 94 test files found; reports of security tests are to be attached
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Drafted; needs the manufacturer’s review and completion.
- Action: Review and complete.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex VII, point 6
Annex VII, point 7: Copy of the EU declaration of conformity (draft included, unsigned)
- Status: Partly shown
- Finding: Drafted; needs the manufacturer’s review and completion.
- Action: Review and complete.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex VII, point 7
Annex VII, point 8: SBOM available for a reasoned request (sbom.cdx.json)
- Status: Evidence found
- Finding: Present in this dossier.
- Action: Review and complete.
- Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex VII, point 8